

A Journey Through
Exploit Mitigation
Techniques
on iOS

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DEFCON.


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About me

- From Kiev, Ukraine
- Staff Engineer at Lookout
- Focused on XNU, Linux and LLVM internals
- Interested in jailbreak techniques
- Worked on obfuscation and DRM in a past
- Member of Fried Apple team

Agenda

- iOS security mechanisms
- Function hooking
- iOS 8 & 9 exploit mitigations
- Bypassing code signatures
- Future codesign attacks

iOS security mechanisms

- Memory protections
- Code signing
- Sandbox
- Secure boot process
- Data protection
- Kernel Patch Protection

Memory protections

- No way to change existing page permission
- Pages can never be both writable and executable
- No dynamic code generation without JIT
- Non executable stack and heap
- ASLR / KASLR

Allocating new regions

```
kern_return_t vm_map_enter(...){  
...  
#if CONFIG_EMBEDDED  
    if (cur_protection & VM_PROT_WRITE){  
        if ((cur_protection & VM_PROT_EXECUTE) && !entry_for_jit){  
            printf("EMBEDDED: curprot cannot be write+execute.  
                   turning off execute\n");  
            cur_protection &= ~VM_PROT_EXECUTE;  
        }  
    }  
#endif /* CONFIG_EMBEDDED */  
...  
}
```

http://opensource.apple.com//source/xnu/xnu-3248.20.55/osfmk/vm/vm_map.c

Changing existing regions

```
kern_return_t vm_map_protect(...){  
...  
#if CONFIG_EMBEDDED  
    if (new_prot & VM_PROT_WRITE) {  
        if ((new_prot & VM_PROT_EXECUTE) && !(curr->used_for_jit)) {  
            printf("EMBEDDED: %s can't have both write and exec at  
                  the same time\n", __FUNCTION__);  
            new_prot &= ~VM_PROT_EXECUTE;  
        }  
    }  
#endif  
...  
}
```

http://opensource.apple.com//source/xnu/xnu-3248.20.55/osfmk/vm/vm_map.c


Code signing

- Mandatory Access Control Framework (MACF)
- Code must be signed by trusted party
- Signed page hashes match running code


Code signature format

- LC_CODE_SIGNATURE command points to a CSBlob
- Key component of blob is the Code Directory
- File page hashes are individually stored into slots
- Special slots (_CodeResources, Entitlements etc)
- CDHash: Master hash of code slots hashes

CS on load validation in kernel



CS page validation in kernel



CS page validation

- `vm_fault` called on a page fault
- A page fault occurs when a page is loaded
- **Validated** page means that page have hash in CSDir
- **Tainted** page calculated page hash != stored page hash
- Process with invalid codesign status will be killed

When to verify?


```
/*
 * CODE SIGNING:
 * When soft faulting a page, we have to validate the page if:
 * 1. the page is being mapped in user space
 * 2. the page hasn't already been found to be "tainted"
 * 3. the page belongs to a code-signed object
 * 4. the page has not been validated yet or has been mapped for write.
 */
```

```
#define VM_FAULT_NEED_CS_VALIDATION(pmap, page) \
    ((pmap) != kernel_pmap /*1*/ && \
     !(page)->cs_tainted /*2*/ && \
     (page)->object->code_signed /*3*/ && \
     (! (page)->cs_validated || (page)->wpmapped /*4*/))
```

Code sign enforcement

- Apple Mobile File Integrity (AMFI)
- Registering hooks in MCAF
 - `mpo_proc_check_get_task`
 - `mpo_vnode_check_signature`
 - `mpo_vnode_check_exec`
 - and many more...

Code sign enforcement



The story about function hooking

- Add new security features
- Debugging 3rd party code
- Logging and tracing API calls
- Reverse engineering and de-obfuscation
- **Interposing** to the rescue

Interposing - DYLD_INFO and LINKEDIT

- Rebase Info - contains rebasing opcodes
- Bind Info - for required import symbols
- Lazy Bind Info - symbol binding info for lazy imports
- Weak Bind Info – symbol binding info for weak imports
- Export Info - symbol binding info for exported symbols

Details - <http://newosxbook.com/articles/DYLD.html>

Having fun with bind info

```
case BIND_OPCODE_SET_SEGMENT_AND_OFFSET_ULEB:  
    segIndex = immediate;  
    address = segOffsets[segIndex] + read_uleb128(&p, end);  
    break;  
case BIND_OPCODE_ADD_ADDR_ULEB:  
    address += read_uleb128(&p, end);  
    break;  
case BIND_OPCODE_DO_BIND:  
    *((void **)address) = new_impl;  
    address += sizeof(void *);  
    break;  
case BIND_OPCODE_DO_BIND_ADD_ADDR_ULEB:  
    *((void **)address) = new_impl;  
    address += read_uleb128(&p, end) + sizeof(void *);  
    break;
```

<https://opensource.apple.com/source/dyld/dyld-360.18/src/ImageLoaderMachOCompressed.cpp>

dyld_shared_cache

- All frameworks and libraries
- Loaded into each process space
- Used for performance and security reasons
- ASLR slide randomized at boot time

Fixed offset in a cache

iOS 8

```
ssize_t send(int a1, const void *a2, size_t a3, int a4)
{
    return __sendto_shim(a1, (int)a2, a3, a4, 0, 0);
}
```

iOS 9

```
ssize_t send(int a1, const void *a2, size_t a3, int a4)
{
    return MEMORY[0x340480C8](a1, a2, a3, a4, 0, 0);
}
```

Fixed offset in a cache

iOS 8


```
ssize_t send(int a1, const void *a2, size_t a3, int a4)
{
    return __sendto_shim(a1, (int)a2, a3, a4, 0, 0);
}
```

wasted

iOS 9

```
ssize_t send(int a1, const void *a2, size_t a3, int a4)
{
    return MEMORY[0x340480C8](a1, a2, a3, a4, 0, 0);
}
```

Trampolines?



Trampolines!

- How to change memory to RW ?
- How to switch back to RX ?
- How to bypass a codesign check ?

Change a memory to RW

- What if mmap new page on a same address ?

```
void *data =  
    mmap(addr & (~PAGE_MASK),  
          PAGE_SIZE,  
          PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE,  
          MAP_ANON|MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED,  
          0, 0);
```

Change a memory to RX

- What if mprotect ?

```
mprotect(addr & (~PAGE_MASK),  
         PAGE_SIZE,  
         PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC);
```

Sounds like a plan

- ✓ Copy original page content
- ✓ mmap new RW page over
- ✓ Copy original content back
- ✓ Write trampoline
- ✓ mprotect to RX
- Do something with codesign(?)

Codesign bypass

- Page is checked on page fault
- How we can prevent page fault ?
- What if we mlock page ...

```
mlock(data & (~PAGE_MASK)), PAGE_SIZE);
```

- ... and it works!

Full attack

- ✓ Get function pointer, get page base
- ✓ `memcpy` page contents to temporary buffer
- ✓ `mmap` new RW page over
- ✓ `memcpy` original content back
- ✓ `mlock` page
- ✓ `memcpy` trampoline code
- ✓ `mprotect` page to RX

We need to go deeper

- Hook `fcntl` in dyld to skip codesign validation

```
fsignatures_t siginfo;
siginfo.fs_file_start=offsetInFatFile;
siginfo.fs_blob_start=(void*)(long)(codeSigCmd->dataoff);
siginfo.fs_blob_size=codeSigCmd->datasize;
int result = fcntl(fd, F_ADDFILESIGS_RETURN, &siginfo);
```

<https://opensource.apple.com/source/dyld/dyld-360.18/src/ImageLoaderMach0.cpp>

Loading unsigned code

- mlock all pages with executable permission during mapping

```
if ( size > 0 ) {
    if ( (fileOffset+size) > fileLen ) {
        ...
    }
    void* loadAddress = xmmap((void*)requestedLoadAddress, size,
protection, MAP_FIXED | MAP_PRIVATE, fd, fileOffset);
    ...
}
```

<https://opensource.apple.com/source/dyld/dyld-360.18/src/ImageLoaderMachO.cpp>

cs_bypass

- ✓ Hook `fcntl` and return `-1`
- ✓ Hook `xmmap` and `mlock` all regions that have exec permission
- ✓ `dlopen` unsigned code ☺

<https://github.com/kpwn/921csbypass>

Future codesign attacks

- Hide executable segment
- Hook dyld functions
- Hook libmis functions

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